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Abstract 
 
The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue 
of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative 
merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the 
principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context. 
                                                 
1 The paper is the outcome of a common research project on the issue of corporate 
governance. The authorship of the first part is mainly to be ascribed to Alberto Chilosi, the 
authorship of the second part mainly to Mirella Damiani. 
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Part I 
Shareholders, Shareholder Value, and Stakeholders 
 
1.1 Two alternative concepts of the corporation and of its governance 
 
1.The corporation belongs to stockholders and in their interest must be run. This conception 
finds its clearest expression in the shareholder value doctrine, according to which the 
corporation must be run in the interest of shareholders, creating value on their behalf. Thus 
the objective of management should be to maximize the market value of the company. This is 
in accordance, in particular, with the interest of minority shareholders, which should be 
adequately protected. 
2. The corporation must be run in the interest of stakeholders. As the interest of stakeholders 
is various and contradictory, a compromise between the pursuit of the various interests should 
be found. This compromise could be trusted to managers (Berle and Means’ view), to 
politicians, to an articulated management board, where the different instances may be 
represented, leading through their interaction and compromise to the specification of the 
overall interest of the company. According to the latter viewpoint the corporation can be seen 
as a community, and as such must be run. In the stakeholders’ view may also be included the 
vision of the social responsibility of the firm, whereby society as a whole is a stakeholder.  
The different conceptions have their counterpart in different aspects of corporate law, from 
the composition and election rules of directors, to the publicity of societal documents, up to 
the determination of the rules that determine the framework of corporate life, concerning 
fusions and mergers, takeovers, and the legal framework of capital markets.2 Of the two 
conceptions the first seems to be dominant, especially in the Anglo-Saxon environment. In a 
somewhat different perspective the various corporate institutional systems prevailing in 
different countries may be seen, whoever are the principals, as different methods to deal with 
the problem of the separation of ownership and control. The second part of the present paper 
is dedicated in particular to the consideration of the latter issue in the specific framework of 
the stakeholder view.  
                                                 
2 For some discussion of the alternative disciplines see Aglietta, Rebérioux (2005, p. 52 f.), 
and the literature quoted there. 
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1.2 Corporate governance and the agency problem 
 
Whatever the actual discipline of corporate governance a large scope for managerial 
discretion remains, leading to an agency problem, as well as a problem of collective action. 
This was already well understood by Adam Smith in a famous passage. 
 
“The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This court, 
indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. 
But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand anything of the 
business of the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them, 
give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly 
dividend as the directors think proper to make to them…The directors of such companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own….Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs 
of such a company.” 
(Adam Smith, 1776, paragraph V.1.107, bold added.) 
 
In the first part of the passage (in bold) one may notice the reference to asymmetric 
information, from which the conclusion of the sentence follows. The final result is contained 
in the last sentence of the passage (in bold). 
For many the issue of corporate governance essentially lies in finding a solution to the agency 
problem.3 Accordingly to an often quoted sentence, “corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). The sentence relates the agency 
problem to the shareholder value viewpoint, but the problem exists whoever is supposed to be 
the principal.  
 
1.3 The normative and positive aspect, and the agency and collective action problems 
 
Both conceptions may have a normative or a positive connotation. The positive viewpoint 
concerns the issue whether corporations are really managed in stockholder (or some other 
stakeholder) interest, the normative one whether they should be managed in stockholders’ 
interest, or in the interest of whom should they be managed. 
Concerning the positive viewpoint, of what really happens in the real world, there are many 
who maintain that corporations are mainly managed in managers’ own interest, or in the 
interest of blockholders (control shareholders) rather than, say, in shareholder overall interest. 
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Two very knowledgeable practitioners who appear to share this opinion are the authors of the 
following two classical quotes: 
 “Shareholders are stupid and impudent: stupid because they buy shares, and impudent 
because they expect to be paid dividends”4 (Carl Fürstenberg, Famous German Banker, 1850-
1933). 
“Petit actionnaire minoritaire, petit con, gros actionnaire minoritaire gros con.”5 (Baron 
Albert Frère, wealthy Belgian businessman 1926-).  
                                                                                                                                                        
Turning to the prominent economists of the past we may add, besides Adam Smith, Thorstein 
Veblen (1904) and Berle and Means (1932). 
Let us consider in particular Veblen’s point of view. 
“…the men who have the management of such an industrial enterprise, capitalized and 
quotable on the market, will be able to induce a discrepancy between the putative and the 
actual earning-capacity, by expedients well known and approved for the purpose. Partial 
information, as well as misinformation, sagaciously given out at a critical juncture, will go far 
toward producing a favorable temporary discrepancy of this kind, and so enabling the 
managers to buy or sell the securities of the concern with advantage to themselves. If they are 
shrewd business men, as they commonly are, they will aim to manage the affairs of the 
concern with a view to an advantageous purchase and sale of its capital rather than with 
a view to the future prosperity of the concern.” (Veblen, 1904, pp. 156-157, bold added). 
 
The quote is of special present interest, owning to the manipulation of share prices and of 
accounting values, associated with the great corporate bankruptcies of the past years, and in 
particular, such as in Enron’s famous case, with the objective of cashing in options and speed 
out of a sinking concern. The passage that we have emphasized in bold deals with a possible 
serious issue of corporate governance, especially in the case of diffuse share ownership: the 
dominance of financial over productive considerations, of the short run over the long run 
perspective. In order to curb the types of behaviour that Veblen laments prohibition of insider 
trading and of manipulating share values through diffusion of false information have been 
introduced. However practical proof of wrongdoings may be difficult. An important 
component of the legislation concerning corporations and financial intermediaries is to 
contrast managers’ tendency to take advantage of their privileged control position to the 
3 For a well articulated, if concise, synthesis of all the various ways in which “managers may 
take actions that hurt shareholders” see Tirole (2001), pp. 1-2. 
4 The original sentence runs as: Die Aktionäre sind dumm und frech; dumm, weil sie Aktien 
kaufen, und frech, weil sie auch noch Dividende erwarten.“ (Quoted in Becht, 1997, p. 14.) 
Biographical information on Carl Fürstenberg is available in the German edition of 
Wikipedia. 
5 Ibidem. Biographical information on Albert Frère is available in Wikipedia (English 
edition). 
 
Chilosi-Damiani                 Stakeholders vs. Shareholders in Corporate Governance 5
detriment of shareholders, and of control shareholders to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. The strength and efficacy of this kind of legislation is notoriously lower in 
continental Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries. But even independently of the agency 
issue, there is an issue of collective action that could lead to prefer governance systems where 
the monitoring of corporations is entrusted to actors with a strong interest in performing it 
(such as blockholders or fund managers, in case of the shareholder value view; trade 
unionists, employees’ representatives or local politicians in the communitarian view). The 
agency and collective action problems are only two specific aspects of the issue of corporate 
governance. However they are relevant for understanding the overall economic and social 
consequences of different systems of governance. Whatever the latter, the legal rules 
concerning corporate governance aim to prevent and repress opportunistic and fraudulent 
behaviour. This kind of intervention is relevant to our discourse, but only as long as its actual 
specification is dependent on the two alternative conceptions of the corporation we have 
considered above. 
 
1.4 Corporate governance and shareholder interest 
 
But then, what is shareholder interest? 
The simplest and most obvious answer is that shareholder interest lies in the maximization of 
corporate profit. But shareholders have different time horizons, subjective discount rates and 
propensities to risk. Moreover the temporal strategy of corporate management can change, 
even dramatically: for instance a company can change its behaviour deciding to maximize 
accounting profits in the short run at the cost of their future reduction (goodwill can be cashed 
in and run down by increasing prices to a level higher than it would be optimal in a long run 
perspective). Furthermore, future profits are uncertain. Even if we were to know them, what 
discount rate should be used for determining the present value of a company? This is unclear, 
owing to imperfections and limitations of the credit market and the intrinsic riskiness of 
capital investment. However the working of financial markets allows to overcome the above 
difficulties. The possibility of trading shares provides flexibility, permitting different portfolio 
allocations according to preferences, while the market continuously values and actualizes 
future prospects. In the end the maximization of the discounted value of corporate profits can 
be seen to be conceptually akin to the maximization of the market value of shares. 
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1.5 Shareholder value (sv) 
 
In a normative perspective the idea that corporations must be run in the interest of 
shareholders finds its counterpart in the doctrine of shareholder value. (The term has been 
made popular by a fortunate 1986 volume by Alfred Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value.)  
Shareholder value creation is shown on the one hand in dividends, on the other in the 
variation of the value of shares and in stock market capitalization. But the value of shares 
continuously changes, following the continuous adaptation of expectations, as well as a 
consequence of short-run events concerning the functioning of the economy (such as changes 
in monetary policy), irrational herd behaviour and fad-like movements,6 simple random walk. 
If a consistent block of shares (or, for that matter, of other financial assets) were to be sold, 
the price they would fetch would be different, even very much so, from the equilibrium share 
price that is relevant for marginal transactions. The price of blocks of shares could be lower, 
but more probably higher than the current share price, especially in case it were to bring 
corporate control. Moreover, one thing may be the market value of a company in the short 
run, another in the longer run. Some types of action, such as increasing dividends at the 
expense of financing investments through retained profits, avoiding risks, but also the 
prospects of future gains, remunerating managers with stock options, instead than with other 
more transparent forms of payments, may increase the value of shares in the short run but 
have a contrary effect subsequently. One could contend that the changes of a company’s long 
run prospects, as engineered by changes in its managerial direction, would correspondingly 
affect its market values (hypothesis of the efficiency of financial markets). But this is to 
assume more transparency of information and foresight than realism and experience would 
allow. On the other hand one could hardly find a better assessment of profitability present and 
future than the market value of shares. 
 
1.6 Shareholder value and accounting 
 
The shareholder value doctrine has a counterpart in the evolution of corporate accounting, 
toward the measurement of the shareholder value produced by corporate management, and the 
determination of the fundamental capability of a company to create value (this means, in the 
                                                 
6 Cf. Shiller (1987 and 2003). 
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end, to be profitable). The objective is to achieve transparency of the fundamental data of the 
company, in the interest of investors.7 
Aside from the contingent variations of stock exchange capitalization, from the point of view 
of the underlying fundamentals the economic value of a company can be seen as the present 
value of the future net cash-flow plus the non-operative assets of the firm (real estate, 
securities, reserves, etc.). This goes in conformity with Rappoport’s famous saying that “cash 
is a fact, profit is an opinion.” However one could also add that if actual cash is a fact, future 
cash flows are an opinion. The objective of accounting should be to arrive at a reasonable 
estimate of the underlying value of a company, independently of the changing quotation of its 
shares, and without the difficulty of having actually to estimate its future net cash flow. 
Certainly for estimating this underlying value it would not be of much use the consideration 
of the historical cost of its assets (at the basis of traditional accounting).  
 
1.7 Fair value (fv) 
 
The solution adopted in recent accounting reforms is to extend the concept of fair value, 
attenuating the recourse to the historical cost of assets. According do the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB)8 fair value is defined as “the price at which an asset or 
liability could be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, unrelated 
willing parties.” The definition, accepted by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), is now contained in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), taken 
over by the EU. As examples of attenuation of the principle of historical cost we may quote 
the accounting standard 39 that relates to the introduction of the registration at current or fair 
values of financial assets, and the accounting standard 16.31 that allows the revaluation of 
                                                 
7Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005), who stress the connection between the evolution of 
accounting principles and the doctrine of shareholder value, criticize the change because 
allegedly in contradiction with the principles of dynamic accounting, a notion originally 
introduced by Schmalenbach in 1926. In their opinion it represents a return to static 
accounting, according to which the valuation of the firm was made in creditors’ interest, in 
times where the relevant notion was the value of the assets in case of liquidation. According 
to them the concept of dynamic accounting is tantamount with the principle of evaluation at 
historical cost. But for Schmalenbach dynamic accounting has the task to understand the 
processes that take place in the firm, the direction of its movement, and thus its prospects and 
the success of its management, comparing two different states, at the beginning and at the end 
of the period (cf. Schmalenbach, 1948, p. 9). The degree of success of corporate management 
may be shown by the variation of the current valuation of the business in time. And this can 
be measured in conformity with the new accounting rules. Cf. Chilosi (2006). 
8 “The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a private, non-for-profit 
organization whose primary purpose is to develop Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
in the United States (US GAAP)” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FASB). 
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real estate according to the fair value principle: “Under the revaluation model, revaluations 
should be carried out regularly, so that the carrying amount of an asset does not differ 
materially from its fair value at the balance sheet date.”9 
 
1.8 Discretionality of fair value 
 
Historical costs are given, fair values are estimated.10 The greater discretionality of fair value 
does not mean that historical cost accounting must be preferred. But the new accounting 
principles can favour manipulations.11 For instance derived financial assets such as options 
can be evaluated in an imaginative way, even more so if they are exchanged over the counter, 
and valued mark-to-model, as in the Enron case. But the latter is in the end, as in other cases 
célèbres, simply an ordinary case of fraud (extraordinary in its dimension, though), facilitated 
by specific accounting rules concessions obtained through political lobbying. And fraudulent 
insolvency has long been a common feature of economic life. The transition of the 
fundamental criteria of corporate accounting from historical prices to current values implies 
greater discretionality, since it is easy (even if in many cases not particularly meaningful) to 
establish how much did the firm pay for something, much more controversial (even if 
obviously of greater interest) to determine the value of assets with continuously fluctuating 
market prices, or assets that do not undergo frequent market exchanges, or the market price of 
which can be hardly determined with some kind of exactitude (such as real estate, and 
immaterial asset such as a copyright, a trademark, a patent, or the knowledge acquired by 
ongoing research, or goodwill). 
 
1.9 EVA 
 
The change in the value of the firm in a given accounting period depends not only on how 
well a firm is run, but also on external factors that affect financial markets as a whole. In 
order to established the degree of success of managerial activity one must also consider the 
cost (this means the opportunity cost) of the resources that are invested in the firm. In the 
shareholder value perspective one should considered the return that could obtained by using 
the capital of the firm otherwise, in investments having an analogous risk profile. Thus we 
have the concept of Economic Value Added, the original paternity of which is attributed to 
                                                 
9 Cf. http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias16.htm 
10 Paraphrasing Alfred Rappoport, historical costs are a fact, fair values an opinion. 
11 On the possible wide diverging estimates of the value of options see Damiani (2006, p. 
208); Hall and Murphy (2002). 
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Schmalenbach, but which in recent times has been formulated by Joel M. Stern, and patented 
as a trademark by Stern, Steward & Company.  
 
1.10 CAPM 
 
But what does it mean the return on other investments with an analogous risk profile? For this 
one should refer to the Capital Asset Pricing Model –CAPM (the brainchild, among others, of 
William F. Sharpe, who because of this too did obtain in 1990, together with Markowitz and 
Miller, the Nobel Prize for Economics).12 
According to CAPM, given a whole set of simplifying assumptions, for instance that agents 
have identical expectations and time horizons, E(ri), the equilibrium expected return of a 
security (or a portfolio) i, is equal to the risk-free return (say, of American treasure bills) rf 
plus a risk premium that is equal to the expected average market return E(rm) (where rm may 
be represented by the stock exchange index), less the risk free return, multiplied by βim, where 
βim is a measure of the riskiness of a security i in relation to that of the market as a whole. The 
greater the volatility of a security (or of a portfolio) in relation to the market as a whole, the 
greater the return the market requires for compensating its relative riskiness: 
 
E(ri) = rf + βim(E(rm) – rf), 
 
where βim is given by the following formula: 
 
βim = Cov(ri, rm)/Var(rm). 
 
1.11 The doctrine of shareholder value and option payments 
 
Another possible manifestation of the doctrine of shareholder value lies in the gigantic 
increase in payments to managers under the form of options, or at any rate tied to the value of 
shares, particularly in the USA and in the nineties.13 A possible explanation lies in the 
diffusion of the doctrine of shareholder value and in the increased awareness of the agency 
problem: with option payments shareholders’ and managers’ interests should be made to 
coincide, which would be especially valuable whenever share capital is dispersed. But there is 
also an alternative explanation: whenever ownership is dispersed, options make a good 
opportunity for managers to mask somewhat the taking advantage of their controlling power. 
According to a view, in Europe those in control of the corporation, be they top managers or 
blockholders, can benefit of a rent of control that is no lesser than in the USA, but, owing to 
                                                 
12 Cf. http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/capital_asset_pricing_model.htm; Sharpe (1964). 
13 See Krugman (2002); Damiani (2006), pp. 125, 209-212. 
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lower protection of minority shareholders may take more obtrusive and fraudulent forms of 
self-dealing (such as, for instance, asset stripping and transfer prices). This is borne out by the 
conspicuous additional payments for transferring ownership of packets of shares with control 
rights.14 In turn, in the USA until recently option payments were not considered as cost items 
and therefore they did not reduce accounting profitability. (In recent times however some 
attempts have been made to take into account their fair value, through a mark-to-model 
methodology.15) Their value is not immediately detectable by the public, and in particular by 
shareholders, especially since in general options are issued “on the money”.16 At the same 
time they have a relatively more limited value for managers, considering risk differentiation, 
and thus they may be equivalent to fixed compensations of lesser value. On the other hand 
option values do not need to have immediate consequences on managerial incentives in so far 
as they depend on overall firm performance and not on EVA; managers can cash in options to 
their advantage even if their firm does not perform any better than the average, whenever the 
stock exchange grows. If it declines, options are often changed to new strike values (or the on 
the money date is fraudulently changed, as in the purported recent case of Apple).  
 
1.12. Lean cats may run faster than fat cats. 
 
On the whole it seems likely that huge managerial remunerations have more a distributional 
than an incentive effect. From an elementary economic theory viewpoint one may consider 
that the wealth effect of increasing managerial compensation could dominate the substitution 
effect. Competition in recruiting the best managers could lead to a race towards increased 
average compensation, but this could result in a negative external effect, producing, because 
of the dominance of the wealth effect, reduced overall managerial exertion. This negative 
effect on X-efficiency could dominate the positive effect of allocating the best managers 
where the positive effect of their managerial capabilities is reputed the highest. Thus 
                                                 
14 Cf. Dick and Zingales (2004). 
15 According to a 1973 ruling of the Accounting Principle Board (APB, opinion 25) stock 
options must be included into the accounting books only for the difference between market 
price of shares and strike price. Subsequently, in 1993, the APB successor, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), advised registering all options at the fair market value, 
according to Black and Scholes formula. In 1995 this became compulsory (according to the 
FASB Statement 123). However, owing to obvious difficulties of that evaluation FASB has in 
practice allowed companies to carry on according to APB provision. Presently new rules have 
been introduced by FASB in June 2005. According to them the fair value of options must be 
recorded at the time of their concession. The whole issue is still debated and in the process of 
revision, as documented in Bulow and Shoven (2005). 
16 This means the purchase price of the shares is determined at the level the shares are valued 
by the stock exchange at the time when the option rights are conferred. 
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increasing the compensation of any top executive officer, for instance, could be associated 
with negative externalities, by putting pressure on the level of other top executive officers 
compensation, to the disadvantage of society as a whole, both because of distributional as 
well as X-efficiency considerations. To curb managerial compensation through direct ceilings 
could be unwise, since there is some argument in favour of having market allocation of 
managerial abilities. But there is probably ample scope in practice to pursue the objective by 
changing the regulations that affect the way through which managerial remunerations are 
determined. More power could be given to shareholders’ (and especially minority 
shareholders’) representatives (and possibly to shareholders themselves through some kind of 
electronic consultation). More transparency and information as to the actual elements of 
overall managerial compensation could be required, and possible tax loopholes on 
participatory incomes could be abolished.17 
 
1.13 The alternative view, of the firm as a community of stakeholders, and the Nirvana 
fallacy 
 
There have been in the functioning of corporations and of financial markets many cases of 
foul play and instability, stock market roller coasters, and bubbles deflating suddenly, to the 
dismay of mass of savers. Does this mean that the Anglo-American system, in particular, as 
founded on the extension of financial markets, and on shareholder value, must be refuted? 
After all, why should corporations be managed in the exclusive interest of shareholders, who 
are simply security owners? “Opponents of the shareholder value concept point at various 
externalities imposed by profit maximizing choices on other stakeholders: on the welfare of 
management and workers who have invested their human capital as well as off-work related 
capital (housing, spouse employment, schools, social relationships, etc.) in the employment 
relationship; on suppliers and customers who also have sunk investments in the relationship 
and foregone alternative opportunities; on communities who suffer from the closure of a 
plant; and so forth.”18 
Thus, why not focus instead on the interest of the stakeholders, such as employees, local 
communities, political actors, or on the interest of the society as a whole, following Berle and 
Means plea (1932, pp. 352-57), or rather on the interest of the company as a going concern, as 
                                                 
17 On the basis of an argument such as the above one could also envisage to increase the tax 
burden on high labour incomes whenever it is low. But this, as in the case of curbs on 
managerial compensation, could lead to some human capital flights, or to a reduction of net 
human capital imports and reduced incentive of undergoing the costs and trouble of business 
education. 
18 Tirole, 2001, p. 23. 
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proposed by some?19 But what is the interest of the company? How do we define it? After all 
the company is an immaterial entity, of organizational kind, not blood and flesh, even if it 
contains blood and flesh. As such, unlike individual stakeholders, the firm has no interests and 
preferences. And who is entitled to interpret and represent the various stakeholders’ interests? 
The negative aspects of market and shareholder value oriented corporate governance are quite 
open and well known (we have reminded some of them above). But this does not mean that an 
alternative system of corporate management founded on stakeholders’ interest could lead to 
better results, without considering in depth its possible overall consequences.20 
 
1.14 Managers and stakeholders 
 
As argued by Berle and Means, managers should become “a purely neutral technocracy, 
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a 
portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity”(Berle 
and Means, 1932, p. 356), where “public policy” could be the outcome of a program set forth 
by “corporate leaders”, “for example … comprising fair wages, security to employees, 
reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business” (p. 356). The obvious 
alternative is that such a “program” should be set through the political process. But then the 
power of whoever is in charge becomes all the more arbitrary as the results of corporate 
activity cannot be assessed, unlike in the case of shareholder value, according to some kind of 
almost objective benchmark. In the name of stakeholders’ interest one may justify nearly 
every course of action, such as in primis the maintenance of unviable enterprises that instead 
of creating value are value detracting, as the resources they use would be better employed 
elsewhere. But also financing politics and politicians; the appropriation by employees or of 
local communities of potential profits through higher wages, higher employment, or 
organizational relaxation; appropriation of company’s resources by managers trough foul play 
(such as self-dealing and transfer pricing); or may be a bit of everything at the same time, in 
                                                 
19 See Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005). 
20 The simple consideration that some stakeholders are affected by corporate decisions does 
not necessarily imply that their interests should be taken into consideration. Every action or 
inaction usually brings about external effects and may affects some stakeholder (in the widest 
meaning of the term). But the law does not protect the interest of every affected person. For 
instance, to make quite an absurd example, my decision to buy or not to buy a new flat affects 
the interest of the seller, the agent, the solicitor. But this does not mean that I should be 
compelled to buy a flat just because all these people are negativerly affected by my refusal to 
buy. Or, more down to earth, matching decisions affect relatives, but the degree to which 
relatives (in particular parents) are allowed by the law to have a say on somebody’s matching 
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order not to do injustice to the different categories of “stakeholders”; last but not least, simply, 
bad management. The consequences of stakeholder management can lead to tragic waste, 
whenever budget constraints are soft, and can be loosened by politicians for pursuing 
patronage, petty favouritism, or other localized political objectives. Of this in Italy we had 
many instances, including in particular the ultimate fate of mixed public-private ownership 
enterprises, where private shareholders had no decisional power, which rested on managers 
appointed by the government. On the other hand lawmakers’ specific vision of the stakeholder 
view can be incorporated in the norms that regulate the organization and the functioning of 
companies, and the representation, and representative power, of the different categories of 
stakeholders in the organs of corporate governance (inclusing such ad hoc measures as 
government’s golden share in some perceived publicly relevant companies). From the 
exertion of the diffent powers, taking into consideration the overall legal and social 
framework, the way in which the interest of the different stakeholders are compromised will 
result. 
 
1.15 Stakeholders’ power and markets 
 
But first of all we want to deal with a basic issue: why should managers be chosen by 
controlling shareholders rather than by the employees, or the trade unions, or, say, local 
authorities? A first motive is that companies are established by partners signing the original 
contract leading to firm incorporation (we apologize for stating this very obvious fact, but 
some discussions on the issue of corporate governance appear to almost forget it). If partners 
(i.e. shareholders) were denied the power to appoint and direct managers they would lack the 
motivation to found and finance the company. It is true that in many cases existing 
shareholders are not the original partners, but the possibility to eventually transfer their 
property rights in the firm, selling the shares of the firm on the open market (“liquidity”), 
constitutes a powerful inducement to found the firm in the first place. Whenever shareholder 
interest (and especially the interest of minority shareholders) is better protected the extension 
of financial markets is greater, and the financing of firms, as well as the control of the way 
they are managed, occurs in a relatively more transparent manner through the market. Selling 
firms in parts or in their entirety is easier. Hostile takeovers, whenever they are effectively 
                                                                                                                                                        
decisions varies across different cultures. In our culture parents of adult partners have no 
rights in this respect, elsewhere it is often contrary the case. 
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possible, may perform as a disciplining device, and possibly lead to a more efficient 
management of resources and higher growth.21 
 
1.16 Financing through the market vs. bank credit 
 
The opposite takes place whenever (as in the “continental” model) the protection of 
shareholder rights is lower, and financing through bank credit is more relevant, as financial 
markets are thinner. Of course bank credit has a number of possible advantages: better 
knowledge of the situation of firms and therefore better monitoring by bankers than by most 
shareholders, increasing returns from bank activity through pooling of information. But there 
are also perceived disadvantages, such as lesser propensity towards financing risky 
investments, among others because lower division of risk. (The cost of giving and managing a 
loan is certainly much larger than that of purchasing and keeping a variable amounts of 
shares. Any individual shareholder may have a modest amount of shares of any company, and 
shareholders are many. A company on the other hand usually deals instead with a very limited 
number of banks.) A consequence can be in continental Europe the lack of venture investors 
and business angels, available to finance risky investments with the aim of liquidate their 
investments by getting public. This is common practice in the USA, where it is made possible 
by the existence of a vast liquid financial market that facilitates new underwritings. The 
limitations in equity financing may put a heavy toll on the creation of innovative firms. As 
Tirole (2001, p. 20) puts it, contrary to the polar case of established firms in mature sectors, “a 
high-tech start up usually generates little or no income for a long while and must therefore be 
financed mainly through equity; short- and medium-term debt would create serious liquidity 
problems.” Moreover the option of going public favours the growth of successful enterprises. 
It can also be a smooth way to solve the problem of generational transition of family 
businesses, and of the need to more or less gradual transfer of corporate control, due to aging 
or reduced interest by the original entrepreneurs. In a shrinking world with high capital 
mobility, limitations to the extent and articulation of financial markets, and lower shareholder 
protection may result in a greater tendency to portfolio investment outflows abroad, especially 
towards countries where the contrary applies (example: the inflow of capitals into the 
American financial market that, among others, contributed to finance the speculative bubble 
of the late nineties; relatively little power of attraction for foreign investments by Italy). 
                                                 
21 But it may also have negative consequences. On this, as on other specific points, one is 
referred for the more comprehensive treatment to the second part of the paper. 
 
Chilosi-Damiani                 Stakeholders vs. Shareholders in Corporate Governance 15
 
1.17 Shareholder value and the social function of profit 
 
But the fundamental motive in favour of the principle that companies must be managed in 
shareholder interest is that shareholder interest  directs firms’ activity towards profit 
formation, instead of alternative objectives, such as those we have mentioned above related to 
the pursuit of stakeholders interests, or simply of carrying on production for its own sake. And 
the pursuit of profit is in the interest of society as a whole, provided of course that it occurs in 
the framework of a whole set of legal constraints that take into account the external effects of 
economic activities, as well as countering market failures and preventing opportunistic and 
fraudulent behaviour. Moreover, as any other human activity, one should expect that in the 
pursuit of profit some kind of basic moral principles should be observed, even if their exact 
definition could be highly controversial. The same applies to etiquette and some sense of 
social responsibility (taking into consideration the consequences of one’s actions on 
everybody else) that should apply to corporate as well as to personal behaviour, and which not 
necessarily is contrary to the profit motive, at least in a long-run, repeated game, perspective. 
Basically, profit is the difference between measured revenues and measured costs. Even if this 
provides a very imperfect measure of the social benefit of an economic activity, still it is 
better to have a very imperfect measure than none at all, and no obvious alternative is 
available. Moreover profit provides a motive as well as, independently of the acceptance or 
refusal of the shareholder value principle, a source of the growth of the firm in a market 
economy. Profitability conditions the extent of external finance, be it from bank credit or from 
financial markets (Damiani, 2006, p. 136). Furthermore, whatever the governance system, 
reinvested profits make on the whole the principal financial source of firm expansion. Some 
do infer from this that size and liquidity of the financial markets should not matter very much 
and that shareholder rights can be limited in corporate governance without much affecting the 
growth of the firms, since the greatest bulk of transactions involve existing shares changing 
hands rather than financing firms through issuance of new shares. Here we can make an 
analogy with the estate market. In the real estate market the bulk of transactions involve 
selling and purchasing existing estate, rather than building new one. At any moment of time 
the set of houses is independent of property rights (alike to the sets of companies and of 
physical capital): you can instantaneously change the nature and distribution of property 
rights in real estate (you could instantaneously change the extent of shareholder property 
rights) and in the short run the available housing stock does not change (the set of existing 
companies and of physical capital does not change). But in the longer run the amount and the 
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quality of available housing changes a great deal, since changing property rights in real estate 
changes the incentives towards construction, maintenance and efficient allocation (changing 
shareholder rights changes the incentives for firms being created, managed and grow). 
 
1.18 Shareholder interest and profit making vs. stakeholders interest and loss making in 
air transportation. 
 
Let us consider a very clear cut case: Alitalia vs. Ryanair. Where does the social interest lie? 
Which one has acted in the best interest of workers (if we consider also the large number of 
workers who take advantage of cheap flights by Ryanair)? Alitalia is an emblematic case of a 
loss making and shrinking company, acting in the pursuit of some stakeholders’ (in particular 
employees’ and politicians’) interest, destructing instead of creating value. Ryanair is a 
competitive, highly profitable, fast growing company, dramatically increasing the supply of 
cheap transport services for everybody concerned: Bye, bye Alitalia!  
 
1.19 Employees as stakeholders, workers’ interest, and the fallacy of composition 
 
Let us in particular consider the interest of those very special stakeholders, the employees. 
From the above mentioned case of Alitalia vs. Ryanair one may well understand that workers’ 
interest in general does not necessarily coincide with the interest of the employees of a given 
firm to have higher wages than elsewhere, more relaxed working conditions, and de facto 
tenure in the job. But would workers’ interest in general be favoured by having employees’ 
representatives as significant participants in the governing boards of any given firm? 
At first sight one would see an affirmative answer as obvious. But this would not take into 
consideration that in every single firm employees’ representatives will presumably try to act 
in the best interest of the employees of that given firm. To think that from the pursuit of 
employees’ interest of any given firm the pursuit of workers’ interest in general follows is an 
example of the fallacy of composition. One may also note that in the prescriptions of the 
labour code employees’ interests are taken into consideration and protected. It is not at all 
obvious that an additional defence in the area of capital governance would be suitable and 
useful. 
 
1.20 Insiders vs. outsiders and the fallacy of the independence of quantity on price 
 
The pursuit of insiders’ interests could (even if not necessarily should: see in particular the 
reference to the German case below) lead to a slowing down of the growth of firms, as a 
consequence, say, of higher wages and lower profitability, and to worse allocative efficiency. 
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This could be to the disadvantage of the outsiders who otherwise could take advantage of the 
growth of the firm, as a consequence of higher employment and a greater and cheaper supply 
of goods and services (Alitalia vs, Ryanair case). The result could be higher unemployment 
and lower living standards for the unemployed, and for those employed in firms with lower 
productivity and lower wages. To the extent that any employment reduction would be 
resisted, this could lead to the blockage of the mechanism that through the market (including 
the market of corporate control) leads to the transfer of resources, labour in particular, from 
where they are less productive to where they are more.22 In the middle-long period at least, 
wage and employment dynamics may be negatively affected at the level of the economic 
system as a whole. 
 
1.21 The issue of scalability and the weight of organized interests 
 
Particular categories of insiders are top executive officers and control blockholders. 
Interventions to their advantage (as well as to the advantage of employees fearing that 
takeovers could result in redundancies) are those reducing the scalability of corporations 
(particularly, as is often in practice the case in Europe, if the takeover bid comes from 
abroad). In some countries the joining forces of organized insider interests, managers, 
blockholders, local authorities, employees, banks can lead to stagnation and bad utilization of 
productive resources.23 The recent relative stagnation of German or Japanese economies 
could be partly explained in this Olsonian perspective, as a consequence of the concretion of 
pressure groups and organized interests. 
A justification of restricting the possibility of hostile takeover bids is that if management is all 
the time exceedingly preoccupied with fending off the danger of hostile takeovers, and thus 
with current stock exchange values, this could lead to excessively shortening of time horizons, 
reducing interest and attention for long run programs.24 This tendency is often considered a 
                                                 
22 Of course, owing to faulty market signals, the substance could be different from the 
appearance, But on this subject we may refer to what has been said above relatively to the 
function of profitability and the nature of market signals. 
23 A way in which the interest of stakeholders can assert itself is by pressing for legislative 
intervention limiting companies’ contestability and scalability. This has taken place towards 
the end of the eighties in the United States, after the Reagan administration devolved at state 
level the competences in corporate legislation, resulting in new legislation curbing hostile 
takeovers. This is translated into the drastic reduction in the percentage of hostile acquisitions 
in the nineties in relation to the eighties (cf. Damiani, 2006, p. 182).  
24 The quote from Veblen above seems here to the point. Moreover the stock exchange 
capitalization may be depressed not only as a consequence of ineffective management, but 
also because of contingent and even irrational factors not economically justifying as such a 
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disadvantage of the Anglo-Saxon public company system in comparison to the continental or 
Japanese system of corporate control by insiders and banks. Indeed, the empirical inquiries as 
to the effective results of takeovers are rather ambiguous and contradictory. 
 
1.22 Possible positive consequences of employee representation in corporate governance 
bodies 
 
Control by empowered employee representatives could contribute to hold in check the 
possible tendencies to opportunistic and self-dealing behaviour by top managers and control 
shareholders. Employee representation in governance bodies could also improve the quality of 
accounting documents, with positive consequences, among others, for fiscal transparency.25 It 
could bring about a better climate of industrial relations, among others as a consequence of 
some greater identification of the interest of employees with the interest of the firm. There 
could be better trust that disclosing preferences and transmitting valuable information by 
employees would be used to their benefit too, and thus it would stimulate the transmission of 
valuable information inside the firm.26 A consideration often heard concerns the protection, 
and thus stimulation, of employees’ firm specific investments. Alternatively, the protection of 
firm specific investments by employees can be engineered on the one hand by the interest of 
the firm towards building a reputation, and on the other by labour law provisions, in particular 
those protecting employees against unfair dismissals. It is by no means obvious that firm 
specific investments by employees, who could because of this aspire to a higher remuneration, 
would find adequate protection through employee representation in governance bodies (or for 
that matter through trade union representatives): Owing to possible egalitarian bias, or to the 
relative numerosity of employees with relevant and of those with little human capital, be it 
general or specific, employee representatives could be biased in favour of the interest of those 
who did not make, or made lower than average, specific investments, and, on this account, 
could not look forward to receive an additional remuneration. 
 
1.23 The case for mandatory employee representation 
 
The case for mandatory employee representation in corporate governance bodies may depend 
on the balance of two possibly contradictory effects. On the one hand some degree of 
involvement of employee representatives in corporate governance could be beneficial for 
                                                                                                                                                        
change of management, but leading to a hostile takeover anyway (the high transaction costs 
and the length of time involved may however reduce this possibility). 
25 Cf. with reference to the specific German case Jackson et alii, 2004, p. 34. 
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overall productivity and value added creation, on the other it could affect the distribution of 
entrepreneurial surplus to the disadvantage of employers. If the second effect dominates the 
first, it will be in the best interest of employers not to establish employee representation in the 
corporate governance of the firm, if only in the form of workers’ councils, while it could be in 
the general interest to establish it if by so doing overall firm surplus could be increased.27 To 
this argument three types of objections could be raised. First, it could be difficult in practice 
to determine what degree, if any, of employee representatives’ power, would maximize, or 
simply affect positively, overall firm surplus. In particular a general legal provision would not 
be able to discriminate between the different firm specific circumstances. Second, the 
previous argument against the enhancement of insiders power, that it could be exerted to the 
detriment of outsiders and the general public, would still apply. Third, the reduction of 
employer power may reduce the incentives to become employers. Supply of managerial talent 
and capabilities could (but not necessarily would) suffer, and this could affect, among others, 
the overall demand for labour. 
 
1.24 The German case 
 
The positive aspects of employee representation in the corporate governance boards (from one 
third to half the members of the supervisory council) may have contributed to the success of 
the German model. An important effect could be to enhance employees’ collaboration in hard 
times. Without the specific German aspects of corporate governance it would have been 
probably difficult to get employees’ agreement toward increasing the work time with 
unchanged wage, as has been recently the case in some German automotive factories. But the 
positive past performance of the German economy and of the German specific features of 
corporate governance could be partly explained through the specific features of German 
society, in particular the high level of social capital (in the sense of Bourdieu-Coleman). It is 
far from obvious that the same would take place in case the German system were to be 
imported elsewhere. Moreover the German economic performance has worsened after the re-
unification: the specificities of the governance system, geared to insider protection, may have 
hindered the ample restructuring processes required by the dislocations of the internal, as well 
of the international, opportunity costs, and by rapid technological change.28 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 Cf. Freeman and Lazear, 1994, pp. 15-16. 
27 Freeman and Lazear (1994). 
28 Cf. Damiani, 2006, p. 126. 
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1.25 Institutions and the social framework 
 
Analogous considerations can be made with respect to the possible export of any given 
corporate governance system, and of the institutions of modern capitalism. This is obvious in 
particular in the case of Russia in the nineties, when independent and responsible institutions 
of financial market control and corporate management supervision were all but absent, 
shareholders’ rights were disregarded by those who were legitimately or illegitimately in 
control, and there was no adequate law and order enforcement. In this case too it is not 
possible to conclude as to the consequences and suitability of specific institutions without 
considering their interrelation with the social environment.29 One must always be careful to 
shun the Nirvana and composition effect fallacies, and avoid being content with what seems 
obvious, but it is not really true. 
 
1.26 In the end: what happens in practice? 
 
Some research has been dedicated to the issue of the overall economic consequences of 
alternative systems of corporate governance (see in particular Gugler, 2001; Maher and 
Andersson, 1999), but the outcomes have been mostly contradictory and ambiguous, such as 
not to allow strong and definitive conclusions.30 This could lead one to think that, in the case 
of corporate governance too, the performance of institutions depends on the social 
environment and that there is a tendency for institutions to adapt to the environment. Or, may 
be, that analogous results can be obtained through different institutional set-ups. Thus, the 
issue remains open and requires further study. 
                                                 
29 Here the notion of institutional complementary may be relevant (see Aoki, 2004, p. 33), as 
well as the role of the interrelation of formal and informal institutions as expounded in Hall 
and Soskice (2001a). 
30 A synthetic review of the empirical studies in this area, see Damiani, 2006, pp. 102, 104, 
110, 123-126. 
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Part II 
The Principal-Agent Problem in a Stakeholder Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As noticed by Blair (1995, p. 214), even in the United States, a country less oriented to 
the stakeholder view, “by the late 1960s and early 1970s corporate responsiveness to a broad 
group of stakeholders had become accepted business practice”. In particular, new theories of 
the firm suggest “a view in which the relationship among the people who participate in the 
production activity of firms are at the heart of the definition of the firm itself” (Blair, 1995).  
This new perspective gains relevance when firm-specific human capital investments are 
the source of ‘power’, as suggested by Rajan, Zingales (1998) and when ‘animate’ assets 
become the critical resource of the firm. In this new scenario, institutional arrangements to elicit 
effort and contribution are complex and qualify the firm as an incentive system” (Holmstrom, 
Milgrom 1994).  
 
2. 2 How to solve the stakeholder principal agent problem  
 
As well known, the various corporate institutional systems prevailing in different 
countries may be seen as different solutions to the problem of the separation of ownership and 
control. They try to design alternative methods to deal with those problems. Some surveys, as 
Prowse (1995); Maher, Andersson (1999); Allen, Gale (2000), Gugler (2001), Becht, Bolton 
and Roell (2003), Denis, McConnell (2003), offer a detailed documentation of these 
‘varieties’ of capitalism. 
The Anglo Saxon economies, characterized by dispersed ownership, are systems 
where individual investors have little incentive for active governance. However, in these 
economies where the single agent has not enough power or incentive to detect and contrast 
inefficient management, alternative forces may play a disciplinary role. Takeover threats, 
managerial incentives, effective boards may mitigate the moral hazard problems affecting 
corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
But how do these mechanisms work in aligning the interests of stakeholders and those 
of their agents? And can the alignment motivation, behind the endorsement of a stakeholder 
society, conceal, instead of mitigating, managerial misconduct and moral hazard problems? 
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2.3 The market for corporate control and the management-labour relationship: 
cooperation or collusion? 
 
Many studies have stressed, but only in a shareholders’ perspective, the crucial relevance 
of the external threats from raiders to induce greater loyalty from managers and favour an 
alignment of interests with their ‘principals’, especially when dispersed ownership impedes a 
direct monitoring over the ‘agents’.  
Leading examples of Anglo-Saxon systems, where not individual owners but market 
mechanisms ensure efficient managerial conduct, are represented by the United Stated and the 
United Kingdom. As shown in Table 1, in these two countries, where a larger fraction of firms 
are widely held and market capitalization is higher, the incidence of hostile bids is more 
significant, thus showing that the dominating force which shapes the governance mechanisms 
is not the individual controlling shareholder, but the market. Misconduct of managers, who 
waste resources and pursue unprofitable projects, is reflected in declining share prices, which 
favors hostile takeovers.  
Managers of a publicly listed firm, who know that the company may be subject to 
takeovers and in that case could be fired by the new owners, are encouraged to adopt profit 
strategies more oriented to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Manne, 1965). The threat of 
management replacement thus improves investor protection. 
 
Table 1: Ownership dispersion, market capitalization, takeovers 
 Firms widely held
(as percentage of 
total firms) 
(a) 
Average Market 
Capitalization of 
Firms 
(millions of $) (b)
Hostile bids 
(as percentage of 
total deals ) (c) 
 
US n.a. 71,650 6,34% 
UK 63% 18,511 4,39% 
Germany 10% 8,540 0,30% 
France 14% 8,914 1,68% 
Italy 13% 3,140 3,04% 
Source: (a): Faccio, Lang (2002): 1996-2000; (b): La Porta et al. (1998), (c): Rossi, Volpin 
(2004), 1990-2002 
 
However, the effectiveness of a market-oriented device to reduce managerial 
discretion may not be ensured for a number of reasons, as reviewed in Damiani (2006). 
First of all, in hostile takeovers a free riding problem emerges. In fact, ‘if a 
shareholder thinks that the raid will succeed and that the raider will improve the firm, he will 
not tender his shares, but will instead retain them, because he anticipates a profit from their 
price appreciation’ (Grossman and Hart, 1980). In this context, where control is a public 
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good, the internalization of the benefits of collective action is hindered by the tendency of 
individual shareholders to avoid monitoring costs and to take advantage of monitoring 
activities performed by other shareholders31.  
Secondly, there is an ex-ante inefficiency: hostile takeovers threats and rent 
expropriation may induce to undertake sub-optimal level of investments. Fear of a hostile 
bidding may lead to negative outcomes such as management entrenchment and short- term 
oriented behavior.  
Thirdly, the beneficial effects of takeovers, as mechanisms to transfer control from an 
inefficient management to an efficient one, may not be achieved when the primary reason for 
bidding is not efficiency improvement. In these cases, as suggested by Jensen (1986), 
takeovers solve free cash flow problems, but not the agency problem. This happens when 
bidding actions are undertaken to pursue growth objectives that benefit managers of the 
buying firm, rather than to improve the efficiency of the corporate target. As stressed by 
Shleifer and Vishny, “a fluid takeover market might enable managers to expand their empires 
more easily, and not stop excessive expansion of empires” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.756). 
The relevance of these forces, which has been evaluated for a long time in a hotly 
debate on takeovers, may now be reconsidered in a stakeholder perspective.  
Consider the following story (Hernández-López, 2003). It refers to two well-known 
luxury goods firms, LVMH and Gucci and involves LVMH’s bid for Gucci, with Pinault-
Printemps-Redoute serving as Gucci’s white knight.  
In 1999 LVMH begins its bid for Gucci, as Gucci has reached financial 
success and its popularity has climbed. Something very different from the 
“managerial misconduct” motivation suggested by Manne.  
“At first, LVMH explained its investments were “passive,” “strategic,” and 
did not represent a bid for Gucci. … by January 26, 1999, LVMH reports to the SEC 
that it had invested $337.5 million to attain 34.4% of shares in Gucci. … Knowing 
LVMH’s reputation and because it was its main competitor, Gucci interpreted 
LVMH’s investment as a hostile bid.”  
“On February 18, with an ESOP, the Gucci board issues 37 million common 
shares to Gucci employees. The effect of the issuance would be an additional number 
of shares in Gucci’s capital stock. Additional shares diluted LVMH’s voting power. 
LVMH now only had a 25.6% stake in Gucci. Theoretically with the new shares 
issued, Gucci could mitigate the LVMH threat.”  
“LVMH responded by suing Gucci … The raider claimed that the ESOP was 
illegal, because the ESOP’s only objective was to limit LVMH from attaining more 
shares, and the ESOP had no  benefits for the employees. Gucci’s legal defense was 
the ESOP was enacted because the board feared for the company’s ‘future well-
                                                 
31 It must be added that the effectiveness of a market for corporate control is not ensured when 
competitive conditions are not prevailing in product and financial markets, and share prices are not 
good signals of firm performance. This implies that good corporate governance must be accompanied 
by pro-competition and anti-trust legislation. 
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being, interests and independence of the company, its employees, independent 
shareholders and other stakeholders.’  Issuing shares to the employees guaranteed  
employees received an interest in the company and control of the company lay with 
the interest of labor. ” (Hernández-López, pp. 152-156)  
 
The Gucci story shows that the assumed interest of the employees may be invoked as a 
deterrent to hostile bids, and that an instrument of labour relations such as ESOP may perform 
as a hidden new powerful anti-takeover device. As a coincidence, exactly at the time of the 
battle between the two luxury goods firms, in 2000 Hellwig writes that managers and 
stakeholders may become indeed “natural allies”.  
Some years later, this intuition leads Pagano and Volpin (2005) to formalize a general 
model where anti-takeover alliances between all the agents (individual shareholders, 
management, and workers) satisfy their incentive compatibility constraints. They show that 
the adoption of employee share owners plan (ESOP), as well as the bargaining of generous 
long term wage contracts, may reduce the attraction of hostile bids, thus rendering 
unassailable corporate control.  
Efficiency wages, as an incentive device to elicit effort from employees, is one of the 
main issues of labour economics. But this approach has always implicitly assumed that 
owners and management have similar interests vis-à-vis employees. However there could be 
alternative governance coalitions, for instance concerning the relationship between managers 
and workers. This is exactly what Pagano and Volpin intend to reconsider. Incumbent 
managers may elicit effort with two different strategies: generous wage payments or strict 
monitoring of workers activities, but these two policies are very different in terms of 
managerial preferences. The cost of the first strategy is borne by shareholders, the monitoring 
cost is borne by the manager himself.  
Secondly, manager’s optimal conduct, aimed at maximizing his private benefits, rather 
than shareholder value, is conditioned by raider’s choices and employees’ reactions. Indeed, 
the raider, who usually purchases a “toehold”, may succeed in acquiring the target firm by 
offering to dispersed shareholders a bid-price at least equal to the after takeover price. The 
increase of the latter will be obtained by cutting wages as possible and increasing monitoring 
activity; therefore the raider may induce a substantial increase of share price, and gains from 
the possession of his toehold shares. But this prospective scenario, where employees’ welfare 
deteriorates, induces workers to ally with their incumbent management. On his part the owner 
of the target company tries to align the interests of management with his own interests and 
thus provides incentives to his executives via inside equity. However, if managerial private 
benefits from wage concessions and a quiet life, on one hand, and takeover costs, on the other, 
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are sufficiently high, neither internal incentives, nor takeovers may solve the moral hazard 
problem.  
To summarize, three main elements are the ingredients of the “natural alliance” 
between managers and workers. 
Firstly, wage bonuses and stable relationships transform employees into shark 
repellent, as Pagano and Volpin suggest, thus reducing the convenience of the bids for the 
potential raider. Under employment protection rules, long term labour contracts are signed 
and the raider cannot succeed in renewing these arrangements, and in wage cutting.  
Secondly, employees become white squires, since they assume an immediate interest 
in contrasting hostile acquisitions, for instance via strikes and a strong opposition to the deal, 
thus performing the same role of those investors that, purchasing an interest in the target of a 
hostile bid, may succeed in deterring takeovers.  
Finally, managers, by simply providing wage premiums and long term contracts, may 
forgo all those riskier and effort demanding strategies represented by investment, plant 
acquisitions and plant destructions, just to name some the few strategies of the empire-
building models of managerial preferences (Baumol, 1959, Marris, 1964). A weakening of 
raiders’ hostile activity permits high wages for employees and less monitoring effort for their 
management, “very much, as in Hicks’s (1935) suggestion that the best of all monopoly profit 
is a quiet life”, as reminded by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003, p. 1047).  
This thesis fits well with the Gucci story and can be formalized with an analytical 
model where entrenchment strategies may reveal credible threats. Furthermore, the same 
thesis can be tested, quite naturally, to explain the experiences recorded in the US, the country 
where during the 1980s almost a quarter of the large US corporations has received a hostile 
bid (Mitchell, Mullherin, 1996). Indeed, the empirical analysis performed by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (1998) for the years 1976-1995 by using COMPUSTAT and LRD databases 
shows that an increased attention to employees does not improve the efficiency of the 
American firms, especially in those firms incorporated in states with anti-takeover laws. On 
the contrary, it is exactly the approval of state-level anti takeover provisions that permits an 
increase in average wages up to the figure of 4% for white collars, without impact on labour 
productivity nor on investments and firm size. In sum, stakeholder protection does not “pay 
for itself”, a result which should call for a better regulation of hostile bids and for company 
laws more oriented to prevent the adoption of anti-takeover devices, sometimes hidden under 
the umbrella of stakeholders’ interests. 
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But now listen to a second story, as told by Shleifer and Summers (1987, pp. 3-4): 
 
“Carl Icahn takes over USZ. He closes down the corporate headquarters and lays off 
thousands of highly paid senior employees who had previously been promised 
lifetime employment by the now displaced managers. He also shuts down the 
factories which dominate several small towns. As a consequence numerous stores, 
restaurants and bars go bankrupt. The stock of USZ goes up by 25 percent…The 
gains to USZ shareholders are offset by losses incurred by laid off employees and by 
the firms with immobile capital whose viability depended on the factories remaining 
open. And other firms find that their workers seeing what happened at USZ become 
less loyal and require higher wages to compensate for a reduction in their perceived 
securities. They also find it more difficult to induce suppliers to make fixed 
investments on their behalf.” 
 
The above case is representative of the massive acquisitions wave undertaken in the 
1980s in the US. In that period, the actions of raiders such as Icahn, Boone Pickens, 
Goldsmith, Perelman, Campeau, motivate books as “Barbarians at the Gate” that turned into 
bestsellers (Tirole, 2006, p.43). In any case, a more serious approach, as that promised by 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), in their paper “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence”, reveals a recurrent feature of hostile bids. Takeovers do not create value but have 
distributive effects that favor target shareholders, without enhancing the acquiring 
shareholders and with ambiguous effects on social welfare. After all, as suggested by Shleifer 
and Summers (1987, p. 23), “it is hard to believe that Carl Icahn simultaneously has a 
comparative advantage at running a railcar leasing company (ACF), an airline (TWA) and a 
textile mill (Dan River). It is more plausible that his comparative advantage is tough 
bargaining and willingness to transfer value away from those who expect to have it.”  
The vast literature devoted to evaluate the takeover consequences has shown that in 
the US the average premium returns of the target shareholders have been in the range between 
15 to 30 per cent (Andrade et al. 2001). On the other hand, there have been negative or no 
significant effects on bidder returns (see Andrade et al., 2001, Stulz et al. 1988). But these 
findings should be reconsidered in a more open perspective, where efficiency and welfare 
considerations are evaluated in the long- term.  
The mere calculations of the abnormal cumulative returns of price assets of target and 
acquiring firms may not capture the ‘reputational externalities’ associated to hostile takeovers 
and their serious allocative effects. This comes true not only because stakeholder losses are 
harder to measure than shareholder gains, but also because in an extended view, the firm is a 
sort of nexus of long term contracts between shareholders and stakeholders. Many of these 
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contracts are implicit and self -enforcing, since they lie on the mutual trust of parties 
(Macaulay, 1963, Williamson, 1985) and “such trustworthiness is a valuable asset of the 
corporation”, as remind us Shleifer, Summers, (1987, p. 7). 
In this context, the apparently well functioning of a market for corporate control 
represents a menace for this valuable asset, since it destroys those nexuses of long term 
relationships and intangible assets represented by the firm’s reputation (Kreps, 1984). In other 
terms, a hostile bid may represent a breach of trust (Shleifer, Summers, 1987), a more serious 
damage that does not only have ex-post distributive effects, but that may reduce the ex ante 
incentives of the potential stakeholders (employees, suppliers, subcontractors) to invest in 
relation specific capital.  
This negative side -effect, as suggested in Chemla (2005), should be properly 
considered by seeing that in the absence of takeovers, stakeholders’ bargaining power 
increases their incentive to invest in the firm, even if, on the other side, it may reduce owners’ 
incentive. Direct evidence on the effect of takeovers on stakeholders’ relationships is difficult 
to obtain; however, Chemla suggests that trade credit may reveal significant aspects of long 
term (implicit) contracts with trading partners. For instance, the findings shown in Mayer 
(1990, p. 312), show that in Japan, where more relevant are inter firm and long term 
relationships than in the US and the UK, firms use more trade credit32, while in the other two 
countries, the market for corporate control is more active. One of the potential rationale 
behind these results is that “suppliers who have blocks of shares in firms are more likely to 
extend trade credit, and at better terms than other suppliers” (Chemla, 2005, p.391). 
Furthermore, viewing trade credit as an implicit contract, Chemla predicts “that takeover 
targets obtain trade credit at more unfavorable terms than other firms before the takeover and 
that these terms improve after the takeovers (Chemla, 2005, p.391). 
Additional evidence is provided in Schmidt (2003). The author shows that in a 
stakeholder society, such as the German economy, corporate governance fosters long-term 
cooperation and encourages firm-specific investments by lenders, employees and large 
shareholders. In this context, insiders are active monitors of management and this may explain 
why even if an active market for corporate control is absent, management turnover is not 
                                                 
32  During the period 1970-85, the percentage of trade credit on the gross financing of non 
financial enterprises has been 18.3% in Japan, and 2.8% and 8.4 in the UK and the US, 
respectively  (see Mayer, 1990, p.312). 
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lower than in other comparable countries, as shown in Table 233. In any case, also other 
relevant studies, such as Kaplan (1994), provide evidence that German supervisory boards are 
effective in removing managers when the firm performs poorly. 
 
Table 2: Market for corporate control and executive turnover (various years)(a) 
Countries Number of 
hostile bids 
Block 
transfers (b) 
Executive turnover 
Germany 4 10% 12% 
France n.a. 10% 11% 
UK 148 9% 9% 
USA 150 7% n.a. 
   Source: Schmidt (2003); (a): Germany (89-94); France (89-91); U.K. ( 89-94), U.S. (80-89) 
   (b) Block transfers (exceeding 10% of total equity) 
 
As said before, the majority of empirical studies on takeovers are capable to capture 
ex-post shareholders gains and losses, but fail in estimating stakeholders’ losses. In a recent 
paper Bruner (2005) has surveyed the vast empirical literature which has animated the value 
creation and value destruction debate on takeovers. What emerges, in our perspective, is that 
of the 130 studies covering the period 1971-2001 none permits to obtain some estimates of the 
benefits for stakeholders, for instance in terms of lower prices or job creation.  
It must be added that researches on European countries, usually considered more 
oriented to a stakeholder perspective, have limited themselves to calculate the abnormally 
high returns reaped by target shareholders, as against the modest gains obtained by bidder 
shareholders. There is no mention of related stakeholders’ premiums (Faccio and Stolin, 
2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006).  
Some interesting, even if indirect, insights on stakeholders returns are however 
inferred by some contributions such as Croci (2004), that extends the analysis to the long run. 
In this case the main findings are that raiders do not stay in a company for a period more than, 
on average, twenty months and many equities are sold within one year from the 
announcement of the bid. The following table shows more precisely these results: 
                                                 
33 However, as noticed by the author, the German system helps to create rents that in part may 
come “from the 'exploitation' of those shareholders who are not insiders, i.e. the small 
shareholders and possibly also some institutional investors” (Schmidt, 2003, p. 18). 
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Table 3: Holding period of raiders’ purchases: mean, median and holding period 
distribution in some European countries, 1990-2001 
 
Holding period (years) Holding period distribution (%) 
 
Mean Median Less than 1 year Less than 2 years Less than 3 
years 
 
1.71 1.23 43.42% 68.42% 82.89% 
Source: Croci (2004), the data refer to UK (1990-2001), Germany (1993-2001), 
France (1993-2001), Italy ( 1990-2001), Switzerland (1993-2001). 
 
One of the conclusions reached by Croci (2004, p. 26) is that in any case “raiders are 
not so prone to interfere with the target management and sometimes limit their action to just 
costless public statements”. The issue concerning the possible inefficiencies of takeovers is 
still open to debate. The available devices for aligning the interests of stakeholders and those 
of their agents, such as incentive plans, should also be considered. 
 
2.4 Incentives and labour relationships in a stakeholder model  
 
Reliable measures of stakeholders’ welfare are difficult to find, and the problem of 
providing explicit incentives to pursue the interests of a multiplicity of stakeholders seems to 
fit well, as noticed in Tirole (2001), with the multitasks agency model suggested by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In this model, a well-designed incentive system has to 
balance the distorsions that may induce effort in one task but indifference and sub-optimal 
strain in some other occupations. 
These considerations gain relevance in a stakeholder perspective, since management 
may rationalize any action by invoking its impact on the welfare of some stakeholders, even if 
these actions worsen the welfare of some others. Since this balance is difficult, a flat 
compensation system may be preferable, and in this perspective, “there is some consistency 
between lenient views in the French, German, and Japanese populations toward the 
stakeholder society and the low power of the managerial incentive schemes in these 
countries” (Tirole, 2001, p. 26). The following table shows that in the U.S., i.e. in the more 
shareholder-oriented system, the CEO’s compensation is less flat than in the other countries:34 
                                                 
34 We shall return later on the the specific German case: see footnote 37. 
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Table 4: Flat CEO’s compensation and stakeholder society:  
variable remuneration as percentage of total remuneration in some countries 
 Variable CEOs’ remuneration component 
Countries 1996 2001 2003 2005 
France 29% 26% 29% 41% 
Germany 12% 36% 51% 52% 
Italy 24% 33% 30% 35% 
Japan 8% 18% 19% 22% 
UK 30% 30% 34% 35% 
US  47% 61% 63% 62% 
Source: Towers Perrin, 2001-2002, 1997, 2005 “Worldwide Remuneration Data”  
 
In any case, even by adopting a flat remuneration system, some critical objections on 
the feasibility of the stakeholder view remain and the existing literature seems to present two 
opposite views. As Jensen (2001) writes:  
 
“ Whereas value maximization provides corporate managers with a single 
objective, stakeholder theory directs corporate managers to serve “many masters.” 
And, to paraphrase the old adage, when there are many masters, all end up being 
shortchanged. Without the clarity of mission provided by a single-valued objective 
function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will experience managerial 
confusion, conflict, inefficiency, and perhaps even competitive failure. And the 
same fate is likely to be visited on those companies that use the so called. 
“Balanced Scorecard” approach—the managerial equivalent of stakeholder 
theory—as a performance measurement system.  
 
Following Jensen, it may be argued that corporate governance arrangements that give 
‘voice’ to employees, as codetermination in Germany, increase agency costs because they 
dilute the board’s power, promote collusion between management and employees and impede 
the emergence of a dispersed ownership.  
On the other hand, the potential strength of a ‘broad’ view of the firm is advocated. In 
this alternative perspective “the multiple and hard-to-measure missions of management” 
(Tirole, 2006, p. 59) are obtained by the same institution of a supervisory board, where 
owners and employees exert their monitoring function on management. Here, again, the 
German experience becomes a benchmark model, but in this perspective this experience 
confirms the success of the ‘stakeholder’ system of corporate governance, as evaluated in Hall 
and Soskice (2001a). A success that may be attributed, in a more comprehensive analysis, not 
only by the sole device of a two-tier board, but also by the crucial role played by some 
institutional complementarities, as we will see below. 
Let us briefly see how the two different radical views may be supported by simply 
making a short excursion of some selected studies that are representative of the pro and cons 
of a stakeholders’ view. 
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The thesis advanced by Jensen (2001) has been proved with different tools, as the 
sociopolitical analysis proposed by Pistor (1999), the legal perspective advanced by Roe 
(1999), or the econometric evidence shown in Gorton, Schmidt (2004), just to name some of 
the few but prominent contributions playing in the arena. 
In the sociopolitical perspective, Pistor (1999) suggests that under codetermination 
labour representatives may be very active actors in extraordinary situations, such as those 
calling for takeover resistance, while exerting a less active role in day-to day governance. 
Employees‘ representatives do not “specialize” in business strategies, but only in workplace 
and employment matters, notwithstanding the training programs to support their professional 
competence, as those undertaken in Germany by the National Federation of Labour Unions. In 
this context where multi-player coalitions are present, the option ‘voice’ remains partly 
unexploited and a room for managerial failures is left open.  “The net beneficiaries are those 
who ought to be controlled: the company’s management” (Pistor, 1999, p. 192). Furthermore, 
the voice of labour may be not a single voice, as the mechanism of worker representation 
reveals conflicts of interests between white and blue collars, who in Germany elect in separate 
sessions their delegates for the designation of the supervisory board. Without speaking of the 
contrast with representatives of labour unions who are elected by the same delegates upon 
proposal of the workers’ organization. In sum, the contrast hidden behind the labour’ s voice 
raises the cost of collective decision-making, without assuring significant benefits for the 
absence of a professional competence of this voice. 
Analogous skepticism can be found on legal grounds by Roe (1999), an impartial 
expert who has devoted much of his academic research in evaluating the parallel defects of 
the shareholder system prevailing in the US (see Roe, 1994). In his contribution of 1999, the 
emphasis is put on showing how the German Board hinders the functioning of an efficient 
securities market, thus determining infrequent Initial Public Offering (IPO) and the presence 
of big blockholders, with the result that German firms remain “semiprivate companies”. One 
of the main reasons is that diffuse shareholders may be unable to ally and to create a balance 
of power as a counterweight to the employee block and as a consequence a German securities 
market does not develop (Roe, 1999, p. 194 -195). 
And finally, let us consider the micro econometric evidence, after having noticed that 
up to recently a rigorous economic analysis has been missing, and there has been little 
quantitative literature devoted to scrutinize the main effects of codetermination. 
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Gorton and Schmid, two authors who have devoted a lot of their research to “class 
struggle” inside the German firms (as the title of one of their works suggest35), in a recent 
study pose two broad questions that focus on the heart of the problem, at least in an economic 
perspective. First, does high employees’ representation on the supervisory board affect the 
performance of the firm, possibly because labour alters the firm’s objective function? Second, 
are shareholders able to offset these distorsions—away from maximizing shareholder 
wealth—by taking countermeasures in attempting to offset the voting power of employee 
representatives?  
The authors try to offer some answers to both questions by studying a sample of the 
250 largest Germany public companies for the years 1989-1993. What they find is that, when 
labour and capital have an equal representation on the supervisory board (1/2 seats each), the 
companies’ market to book values are lower in comparison to situations when labour 
representation is lower (1/3 of seats). And the losses do not reduce over time, but range from 
21% in 1989 to 43% in 1992.  
A rationale behind these results is that employees wield enough power to obtain 
private benefits of control, and pursue this strategy by altering managerial remuneration, as 
confirmed by the weaker link, in cases of more extensive labour participation, between 
executive managerial compensations and company results. Moreover, employees’ 
representatives aim at maintaining a high staffing level and wield resistance to corporate 
restructuring. On their part, shareholders try (unsuccessfully) to adopt countermeasures, by 
linking supervisory board compensation to firm performance and by leveraging up the firm, 
thus increasing the cost and probability of bankruptcy failures, but these countermeasures end 
to be “costly and imperfect.”(Gorton, Schmid, 2004, p. 895) 
Let us now consider a more optimistic view following the comprehensive approach of 
Hall and Soskice (2001a) and the several contributes collected in the book they have edited 
and devoted to analyze the varieties of capitalism around the world (Hall and Soskice, 
2001b). 
In this context it is important to remind the relevance of the relational view of the 
firm, as the quality of the relationships the firm is able to establish is a crucial ingredient of its 
dynamic capability (Teece and Pisano, 1998). From this perspective, as suggested by Hall and 
Soskice (2001a), a core distinction may be traced between two different kinds of relationships 
that seem to prevail in different systems, the coordinated market economies and the liberal 
                                                 
35 See Gorton, Schmid (2000).  
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market economies. A distinction that shows some significant overlaps, as we shall see, with 
the difference between a ‘broad’ and a ‘narrow view’ of the firm. 
In coordinate market economies, as in the German case, extensive relational and 
incomplete contracting entails more reliance on collaborative relationships and on the 
exchange of private information. This is coherent with the view that “when complete 
contracts are too costly or impossible, parties settle for relational agreements that frame their 
relationship over time” (Morroni, 2006, p.207). 
In Germany, this design is mirrored in moderate wage differentials across firms and 
industries that reduce the propensity of employees to change jobs, thus contributing to a 
compressed wage structure and to long employment tenure. The employment stability is 
implemented, at least at a first glance, through the functioning of two relevant labour market 
institutions. The first one is the industry-level wage bargaining that prevents intra-industry 
wage differentials and generates low spreads by firm size, thus lowering voluntary separation 
rates. The second one is the legal institution of codetermination at the level of the supervisory 
board and works councils. These arrangements, as shown in Freeman and Lazear (1994), 
enhance the efficiency of the firm by permitting the flows of communications between 
management and workers, but give voice to employees in their demand for lower layoffs and 
lower labour shedding in case of adverse shocks. In this framework, where an implicit 
empowerment of labour is provided, the interplay of wage and labour setting rules reveals a 
crucial factor (FitzRoy and Kraft, 2004). Indeed, as the study of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
has shown in a general context, insiders’ involvement may generate lobbying and ‘influence’ 
costs with negative side effects that outweight the efficiency gains obtained from better 
communication. One of these potential drawbacks could be a higher bargaining power over 
the distribution of the company results, with sub-optimal outcomes. It has been well clarified 
by Freeman and Lazear (1994). 
Assume, following the two authors, that assigning control and information rights to 
workers’ councils increases firm’s rent over the level obtained without these organizations, 
but assume also that these rights affect the division of rents. A clear trade off arises as the firm 
observes that a higher works council power may enhance productivity and rents (a larger pie), 
but reduces its own share (a smaller slice). The firm’ s choice is a lower sub-optimal level of 
codetermination since it cannot fully appropriate all the benefits from collaborative labour 
relations. An escape and solution to the dilemma could be to separate the factors that affect 
the magnitude of the surplus, from those that have an impact on its division. As underlined by 
FitzRoy and Kraft: “the designer of co-determination seem to have been aware of these 
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problems, because collective bargaining is formally quite separate from all aspects of 
codetermination” (FitzRoy, Kraft, 2004, p. 6). 
Unlike Germany, in Japan long- term relations are enforced by long term incentives of 
internal promotion and by returns of seniority that magnify the high commitment of 
employees to company success and promote lifetime employment, thus encouraging firm-
specific investments in human capital. By contrast, in Germany, as is well synthesized in 
Jackson, Höpner, Kurdelbusch (2005, p. 89), “training takes place within a multi-employer 
and quasi-public system of occupational training. These skills are portable and related to 
broad occupations rather than firm specific”.  
A synthetic representation of the different wage and employment setting rules in 
coordinated market economies, such as Germany and Japan, with respect to those adopted in 
liberal market economies (US and UK) is offered by the following table: 
 
Table 5: Comparative features of labour relations in Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) and Liberal Market Economies (LME)Stability of employment, wage 
setting system and wage spread 
 
Countries Separation rate as % of 
new hires 
Employment 
tenure 
(average tenure-
years) 
Bargaining 
level 
(dominant 
form)  
 
Wage spread  
(ratio of the ninth 
over the fifth 
decile) 
Ratio of 
remuneration of 
manual workers in 
Manufacturing to 
CEO 
(%) 
CME      
   
Germany 
27.2 9.7 sectoral 1.64 8.8 
   Japan n.a. 11.3 sectoral 1.73 9.5 
 
LME       
   US 65.9 7.4 company 2.22 3.2 
   UK 42.9 7.8 company 1.99  
Years 1990s 1995 1990s Early 1990s 2000 
Sources: OECD, Employment Outlook (various years); European Commission (2003), Towers 
Perrin (2005), “Worldwide Remuneration Data” 
 
What complementary institutions are necessary to implement the stakeholders-labour 
governance? Are only the labour regulation rules sufficient to explain the success of German 
and Japanese firms? Here the argument of the role played by institutional complementarities 
suggested by Aoki (1994), reveals to be decisive. This reminds us that the efficiency of one 
institution increases the efficiency of the others.  
Indeed, in coordinated market economies, long term employment relationships call for 
a “financial system capable of providing capital on terms that are not sensitive to current 
profitability. It suggests that nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the 
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economy should develop complementary practices in other spheres as well” (Hall, Soskice, 
2001a, p. 18).  
Also, the option voice, which sustains long term relationships, is related to 
concentrated ownership which permits to overcome the free-riding problem of dispersed 
ownership, since large investors are able and motivated to exercise control by obtaining 
significant gains by their monitoring activity. In addition inter-firm relations are relevant and 
are achieved by cross-shareholdings in Germany, where more than 40% of total shares of 
companies are owned by other non financial enterprises (see Table 6), or through business 
networks, built on keiretsu organizations, in Japan. 
Moreover, bank monitoring may be a relevant element in relational financing. For 
instance, in Germany, banks and client firms maintain long term relationships since banks 
have access to information on firms’ financial conditions (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). Thus 
they are able to distinguish between good and bad projects and may renegotiate with failing, 
but efficient, firms in difficulties, thus avoiding their premature liquidations and favoring their 
restructuring.  
Table 6: Comparative features of corporate governance in the 1990s in Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) and Liberal Market Economies (LME) 
Concentration of ownership and of voting rights, role of financial institutions, inter-firm 
relations 
Countrie
s 
Concentrated ownership 
(average percentage of 
shares owned by the first 
5 largest owners) (a) 
Largest voting 
block (as a 
percentage of 
voting shares) 
(median) 
(b) 
Financial institutions  
as principals 
(percentage of total 
outstanding shares) 
(a) 
Inter firm relations (percentage 
of common stocks owned by 
other non financial enterprises) 
(a) 
Years  1992-1996  1994-2001 
CME     
   
Germany 
41.5 57.0 33.0 42 
   Japan 33.1 n.a. 38.5 22 
 
LME     
   US 25.4 5.4 - 8.6 (*) 2.2 0  
   UK 20.9 9.9 0.7 1 
Sources: (a), Prowse (1995); (b) Barca and Becht (2001, table 1.1) data for non financial 
enterprises, (c); OECD (2003). (*) the figures refer, respectively, to NYSE and NASDAQ 
 
Summing up, the coexistence of concentrated ownership, long term oriented strategies, 
bank financing, inter-firm relations, industry-level wage bargaining, small wage dispersions 
are all significant aspects of a variety of capitalism, where relevant forces are present capable 
to implement long term relationships and the interests of a group of stakeholders. 
Furthermore, these coordinated economies are more oriented toward investing “in specific and 
co-specific assets - i.e. assets that cannot readily be turned to another purpose and assets 
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whose returns depend heavily on the active cooperation of others”, as Hall and Soskice 
suggest (2001a, p.17). It is not by chance, as documented by the European Patent Office, that 
German firms specialize in those sectors (mechanical engineering, product handling, 
transport, machine tools) characterized by incremental innovation, while lagging behind the 
US in fields (biotechnology, semiconductors, telecommunications), where innovation are 
more radical and represent strong discontinuities. 
By contrast, liberal market economies, featuring short-term relationship, tend to invest 
more extensively in switchable assets (i.e. assets whose value can be realized if diverted to 
other purposes). In this context, institutional complementarities work in the opposite 
direction. In these economies, corporate governance arrangements permit to investors who 
seek an immediate assurance of return of their assets to freely exert the option exit. These 
features are complementary to analogous market channels to obtain finance and are parallel to 
market relations and arm’s-lenght exchanges of labour services. In these economies, the 
distinctive features of labour relationships are wage patterns linked to labour market 
conditions, decentralized company level bargaining, and finally no restrictions on labour 
adjustment. Moreover, market failures, as moral hazard and selection adverse problems, are 
solved by explicit incentives such as pay-performance systems or employee share ownership 
schemes that are introduced to enhance wage flexibility.  
A parallel interpretation of these findings is that remuneration schemes, as tools for 
corporate governance, emerge as an indirect control device under conditions of imperfect 
observability (Holmstrom, 1979), and therefore, when other direct control measures are 
absent.  
This proposition fits well with observed phenomena, as shown in the following table: 
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Table 7: Remuneration and incidence of incentive systems in Coordinated 
Market Economies (CME) and Liberal Market Economies (LME) 
Countries Remuneration 
of CEOs 
(US=100) 
2005 
Percentage of firms that offer 
 long term incentives to  CEOs 
 
2005 
Percentage of firms 
that use Profit 
sharing (PS) and 
ESOP 
1990s 
CME  Stock options Restricted stocks  Bonus shares 
plans 
 
   Germany 47.1 40 5 10 PS. 13% 
ESOP 4% 
   Japan 44.2 35 0 0 PS. 13% 
ESOP 3% 
LME      
   UK 54.4 80 0 60 PS. 40% 
ESOP 23% 
   US 100 85 35 35 PS. 20% 
ESOP 7.7% * 
Sources: Towers Perrin, 2005, “Worldwide Remuneration Data” and Equity Report, OECD (2003); 
Poutsma (2001) and Kruse (2002); * percentage of private sector employees participating in ESOP 
schemes 
 
The different remuneration levels among countries confirm that managerial incentives 
play a crucial role especially in Anglo-Saxon systems, since direct monitoring and incentive 
payment systems emerge as close substitutes. Furthermore, the composition of incentive 
schemes, as documented in the last Equity Report by Towers Perrin, shows that the US 
system tends to rely more on performance-based rewards and on long-term incentive plans, as 
stock options or restricted stock, which represent an explicit incentive to pursue firms’ 
successful strategies. These payment systems, as shown in the recent literature on executive 
compensation summarized in Damiani (2006), have also been an essential selection and 
retention tool in managerial labour markets, a very strategic tool in a context where short-term 
relations tend to prevail (Ittner, Lambert, Larcker, 2003; Oyer e Schaefer, 2005). These 
considerations may explain why their relevance is still prominent today, even after the scandal 
and managerial failures that have triggered the corporate governance reform undertaken in 
2002 (Sarbanes Oxley Act). Moreover, their diffusion is accompanied by employee 
participation in profit and ownership, as well documented in Poutsma (2001) and Kruse 
(2002), as shown in Table 7.  
However, if top executives exert their influence on compensation committees and adopt 
rents seeking behavior, managerial rewards becomes not a solution, but a manifestation of 
agency problems as shown in Bebchuk, Fried (2003). In this context, all the other subordinate 
workers may share rent seeking behavior and a pervasive inefficient compensation structure 
tends to prevail.  
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This has serious negative implications, as suggested by Baker, Jensen e Murphy (1988): 
“The effect of structuring CEO contracts that are independent of performance is likely 
to cascade down the hierarchy-each successive layer has fewer incentives to structure 
effective contracts than the prior layer. The absence on incentives is pervasive, and it’s not 
surprising that large organizations typically evolve into bureaucracies” (Baker, Jensen e 
Murphy , 1988, p. 614). 
In Germany and Japan, where management control is easier and less expensive and 
lifetime commitment is higher, executive rewards are lower. Moreover, in these countries the 
lower level of managerial salaries is accompanied by a weaker link to company performance 
(table 4) and the wide diffusion of stock options and bonus shares paid not only to CEOs but 
also offered to all ‘agents’ is absent. Furthermore, the analysis of the German 100 largest 
companies shows a clear positive correlation between shareholder value orientation of these 
enterprises and incentive orientation of their payment schemes for non executive employees 
(Jackson, Höpner, Kurdelbusch, 2006, pp. 106-112). This wide diffusion is, on the other hand, 
very often recorded in the US and the UK, where Profit Sharing Schemes and ESOP Plans36 
are paid to a broader base of dependent employees (Table 7). 
The previous analysis confirms that the diffusion of forms of financial employees’ 
participation has not been a part of a “package of participation” in control rights. This sort of 
bifurcation between payoff and control rights has been well documented by the vast 
participation literature (Uvalic, 1991; Poutsma, 2001; Pérotin, Robinson 2003; Uvalic, 2006). 
As stressed in Uvalic (2006), “although traditionally the main arguments in favor of financial 
participation were motivated by objectives such as greater equality in the distribution of 
income and wealth, and improving relations between workers and capitalists, today these 
schemes are considered as part of a new culture of industrial relations based on innovative 
managerial strategies and more flexible remuneration policies, which should ultimately result 
in increased enterprise efficiency” (Uvalic, 2006, p. 50). The majority of studies in this field 
have shown how the wide diffusion of various forms of financial employee participation has 
performed with the main aim to enhance wage flexibility, to achieve productivity gains and to 
implement a risk-sharing device. This explain why they have found a natural space in liberal 
market economies, more than in coordinated market economies. On the other hand, there are 
not conclusive results on the positive impact of a larger involvement of employees in 
                                                 
36 As clarified in Uvalic ( 1991, p.10) ESOPs “… involve a bank (or other lender) lending 
money to an employee benefit trust, which acquires company stock that is allocated by 
periodic payments to each employee’s ESOP account”. 
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decisional processes in terms of productivity gains, and only some studies (see Conte, 
Svejnar, 1990) are capable to confirm the positive interactions between the various forms of 
participation. In any case, the debate on advantages and disadvantages of employee financial 
participation, as overviewed in Uvalic (2006), has mainly concerned issues such as workers’ 
incentives, wage moderation, promotion of firm-specific human capital investments--via long-
term labour contracts, lower intrafirm conflicts--less inequalities, risk sharing properties. But 
it must be admitted that this is a clear ‘shareholder’ perspective, one in which theorists and 
econometricians have the hard task to prove that “wage premiums pay by themselves”.  
On the contrary, in a ‘stakeholder’ view one of the main claims should be that “if 
employees have no input into decision, they are exposed to moral hazard on the part of 
managers, who may make decisions that affect pay and or wealth negatively. The problem is 
potentially more severe with employee share ownership than with simple profit sharing…” 
(Pérotin, Robinson, 2003, p.11) 
This is the preferential attitude declared, in 2004, by the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance where it is said that “the corporate governance framework should 
permit performance enhancing mechanisms for stakeholder participation “ (OECD, 2004, 
section IIIc, p. ) 
To what extent this participation has been reached may be, at least partly, assessed by 
the diffusion of the various forms of participation all over the countries, as well documented 
in the 2003 OECD survey, one of the few that devotes a section to describe the diffusion of 
stakeholder protections. 
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Table 8: Control rights and payoff rights of employees 
Countries Employees 
appoint 
some 
board 
members 
(a) 
Mandated 
Works Councils
Statutory 
threshold  
(b) 
Decision making 
power  
(c) 
Diffusion of financial 
participation schemes 
 
Percentages of private 
and public companies 
that adopt Employee 
Share Ownership Plans 
(ESOP) 
and Profit Sharing (PS) 
   Austria Yes 5 employees*  Personal matters ESOP: small number of 
ESOP  
PS: n.a. 
Belgium  No 100 employees  Work regulations, 
recruitment, dismissals, 
welfare and holidays 
ESOP: Selective 
application in specific 
companies 
PS: mainly by 
multinational firms 
Denmark Yes 35 employees Working conditions, 
personnel policy and 
training 
ESOP: 6% 
PS: 10% 
Finland No 30 employees - ESOP: n.a 
PS: small number of 
companies 
France No 50 employees Management of all 
company welfare 
schemes 
ESOP: 7% 
PS:57% 
Germany Yes 5 employees* Social welfare, 
personnel policies 
and economic affairs 
ESOP: 4% 
PS: 13% 
Ireland No No n.a. ESOP:4 % 
PS: 8% 
Italy No 15 employees - ESOP:3 % 
PS: 4% 
Japan No No n.a. ESOP:3 % 
PS: 13% 
Netherlan
ds 
Yes 50 employees Rules concerning 
employees benefits, 
working hours, 
holidays, health and 
security, recruitment, 
dismissals and 
training 
ESOP: 3% 
PS: 13% 
Spain  No 50 employees  Collective 
agreements 
ESOP: 10% 
PS: 8% 
Sweden  Yes No Cn.a. ESOP: 2% 
PS: 20% 
UK No No n.a. ESOP: 23% 
PS: 40% 
US No No n.a. ESOP: 7,7%* 
PS: 20% 
Sources:(a), (b), (c): OECD (2003, pp. 47-50); (d): EPOC Survey (1996), Poutsma (2001, p. 57) Kruse 
(2002, p. 67); * percentage of private sector employees participating in ESOP schemes.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
In shaping governance and labour management in a stakeholder society, a whole set of 
institutional factors, much more than the sole codetermination arrangements, are shown to be 
crucial.  
In this context the role of institutional linkages and complementarities may offer a 
fruitful line of research, as this perspective leaves a natural space to reconsider the full range 
of opportunities left to labour coalitions with the other two actors, capital and management. 
After all, as noticed by Pagano and Volpin (2005, p.841) “Labor economists view industrial 
relations as being shaped by the conflict between workers and management. Financial 
economists view corporate governance as the outcome of the diverging interest of 
shareholders and management. Actually, these two conflicts are present simultaneously and 
interact”. 
Indeed as seen in the previous sections, the comparison of the various forms of 
capitalism reveals the potential drawbacks when workers are natural allies of managers and 
become accomplices of their misconduct. In this scenario, the traditional conflict between 
capital and labour may be replaced by a new conflict between strong insiders (management, 
employees, blockholders) and weak outsiders (small shareholders). In this scenario, the ‘broad 
view’ of the firm does not represent a remedy to externalities and sub-optimal results, but on 
the contrary it may be at the origin of new failures. In any case, as noticed by Coffee (2005), 
in the last decade, the different economies, the coordinated market economies as well as the 
liberal market economies, have witnessed different forms of failures and scandals. However, 
they have shared a common feature represented by a bad performing function of their 
respective governance gatekeepers. Enron and Parmalat, from their respective sides, offer 
dramatic but instructive lessons. 
In this scenario, where the eventual convergence37 toward a unique system of corporate 
governance may represent the menace of a convergence toward a uniform kind of failures, 
labour may assume a potential role as a natural guardian of firm accountability. Control by 
empowered employee representatives could contribute to mitigate opportunistic behavior and 
rent seeking by managers and to reduce private benefits of control accruing to blockholders.  
                                                 
37 The ‘convergence’ issue is still controversial and open to debate; for instance, for the 
German case Jackson, Höpner, Kurdelbusch (2004) stress that “a more marketized role of 
capital has led to changes toward more marketized employment relations in Germany”. 
However, the author stress that “the diffusion of shareholder-value has not undermined the 
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After all, if we conceptualize the firm as a set of multilateral contracts over time, and 
admit that employees sign implicit and explicit agreements with the other parts, their rights to 
bargain over the distributive effects of these agreements must be acknowledged and the 
condition of a fair contract is required. As Freeman suggests in his “stakeholder 
interpretation’ of corporate governance, one device for obtaining fairness is the Rawlsian ‘veil 
of ignorance’:  
“Our common sense notion of fairness is illustrated by the problem of dividing 
a cake into two pieces for two individuals. The ‘’fair’ solution is for one individual to 
cut the cake and choose last, or put another way, to cut the cake without knowing 
which piece he will receive in the end… Interpreting fairness as taking place behind 
the veil of ignorance is consistent with the spirit of transaction cost economics, since it 
must take into account both ex post and ex ante perspectives. It would be irrational for 
stakeholders to give up the ability to participate in monitoring the actual effects of the 
firm on them… ” (Freeman, 1990, p. 357). 
                                                                                                                                                        
core institutions of German industrial relations, namely codetermination and collective 
bargaining” (p. 40). 
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